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In the developmem of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1980 rhe concepr of 
democracy was determined more by the need to establish firm political 
unity than by consriruting a state oased on the rule of law and res~cr 
for tndividual rights. Democratic substance was first sought in the tdea 
of the single nationality of all Yugoslav nations then in the domination 
of one nation, then in different variants of proletarian internationalism. 
The author considers tha.t the absence of traditions of liberal democracy 
and the lack of institutions of the dvil sodety may again move the focus 
of the development and concept of democracy into political hornogeni· 
zation instead of into the development of liberal tendencies, whicl:i are 
in hi~ OP.inion the only thing that gives real value to a modem political 
constitutiOn. 
The history of Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1980 is an example of an unsuccessful 
attempt to create a transnational state, which has today come to a definite end. 
National conflict, more or less hidden, existed in all the phases of it~ development, 
and I consider this is what completely determined the concept of democracy in 
the region. 
To show this I will give a short sketch of Yugoslav development from 1918 
to 1980, accepting the usual division into five periods: the first from 1918 to 
1928, when Yugoslavia was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croars and Slovenes (it was 
proclaimed Yugoslavia 3 October 1929); the sccoJJd the period of authoritarian 
rule, 1928-1941; the third the rime of fascist dictatorship, 1941-1945; the fourth 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, 1945-1965 (the time of "the people's 
democracy") and the fifth the period of "federalization of tJ1e federation", 1965-
1980. 
First period; the Kingdom of SCS (1918-1928) 
In the first phase (1918-1928) the idea of the Yugoslav state was derived from 
the concept about South Slav unity. It was widely accepted that the Slovenes, 
GroatS and Serbs were one and the same people, and the idea of Yugoslav statehood 
was based on this unity. However, the South Slavs are the Croa~ Serbs and 
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Slovenes, i.e. peoples of different cultures and religions, who experienced differing 
courses of historical development and have differenr languages and scriptS. From 
rhe very momenr when Yugoslavia was created there was conrroversy abom 
whether me Yugoslav peoples were associating or UI1iting. Associaoan was taken 
tC\ mean respect for the independence and nationaJ identio/ of each member of 
rhe new state, whereas unicy meant to acknowledge Lhe leading role of one nation. 
Serbia, which was already a constirured political entity, was interested only 
in the extension of its own political unity or a role of hegemony in the creation 
of a new political entity of South Slav nations. Croarla, which had its own culture 
and historical rradition of Statehood, could not agree to this. In rhis conflict Slovenia 
sided now with one now with the other side, guided by its own interests. Thus 
the very act of creating Yugoslavia was more a case of attempts to outmanoeuvre 
others rather than any democratic consensus about me basic principles of the furure 
political entity. Later this had far-reaching consequences. Add to this the siruation 
m the world and me course of history, which was not kindly di.sjx>sed towards 
losers, and it is dear mat the new state did not result from any long-lasting and 
gradual development of the common wiD of rhe south Slav peoples, but t.har their 
unity was forced on them because of me existing world siruation. These 
unsua:.essful initial steps in creating a common state resulted in opposition which 
fmally developed into strong nationaJ homogenization and me defence of national 
inrerests. 
Therefore, in l>-pite of the fact that a single and common sracc had been created, 
the political struggle wao; based on polidcal unions that were clearly profiled by 
national boundaries. "The Kingdom of Serbia had prepared rwo variants: eidler 
an independent and enlarged, Le. greAter Serb.£3, or a common state with a position 
of hegemony for SCLbia. This political concept was accompanied by great 
propaganda and ideology, which has Still not ended today and which has had 
ominous results in spreading national intolerance. Myths were consciously created 
that have nothing to do with a critical attitude towards history. 
Secaad period; the Kingdom of Yugosla via {1928-1941) 
In the second phase (1928-1941) , since consensus about the character of the 
newly-established state could not be reached, a period of open dictatorship began 
in Yugoslavia. The king abolished parliament and proclaimed that "there can and 
must be no intermediary between sovereign and people", and (on 6 January 1929) 
made himself the exclusive bearer of power in the l!and. The Law on Royal RuJe 
and Supreme Government of 8 January 1929 made his might absolute. He 
pcrfonned all state functions, "made and proclaimed laws; appointed state officials 
and bestowed military commissions". The king was also "supreme military 
commander" and represented the "state in all its relations with oilier states"; he 
"proclaimed war and signed peace" (Article 4). The person of the king was 
sacrosana, which meant that "he was not accountable for anything. nor could 
the king be sued". Hodimir SirotkoviC described the situation that arose as follows: 
"The dictatorship of King Alexander was a monarchic dictatorship of the Balkan 
type based on lhe army and the police force, without any ideology, which guarded 
the acquired privileges and positions of me Serbian middle dass by the naked 
force of the bayonet and police terror" C' Francuska reiiO/UCJ]a - /judska prava i 
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po/iti&a demokradja nakon dvjest11 godind' /Tbe French Revolution human rights 
and political democracy tv.'O hundred years lateT/, Globus, Zagrcb, ed. Eugen Pusic, 
p. 541) . 
On 3 September 1931 the so-called Octroyed Constirurion sanctioned Yugoslav 
unitariansm. Article 1 of this Constitution dcfmcd the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as 
a "hereditary monarchy", leaving our the designation •parliamentary". The king's 
power was not limited by the constirution, and the rights of individuals and groups 
were not protected. Several important acts were passed (Decree, 30 December 
1920, and the Law on the Prorecrion of Public Security and Sl8lc Order, 2 f\ugust 
1921) aimed both ag-crinst the communists and againSt Croarian demands for a 
federal state. This was an attempt by one nation to seize a dominant role in 
Yugoslavia, which had to lead ro the resistance of the other nations. 
Third pen"ot:J.,· period of fascist diccamrship (1941-1945) 
This was a tim.e when pure national states were fom1ed that wanted to radically 
remove all foreign elements through national homogenization and t.hus definitely 
solve the national question. ALlempts were made to resolve the bad solutions of 
the common state by using even worse methods. 
Ethnic cleansing of all elements foreign to one nation led to a terrible pogrom. 
This crazed and temble method has not yet been discarded. The liberation war 
in Yugoslavia, which began during the occupation, was nor only a war against 
the occupying forces bur a new attempt to arrive at a just solution of the national 
question. 
Foun:b period; period of the "diCtlltocship of the proletariat" {1945-1965} 
In the formation of a new Yugoslavia previous negative experiences in solving 
the national question were bom in mind. At the second session of A VNOJ 
(Antifascist CoWlcil. of the National Uberat:ion of Yugoslavia) on 29 and 30 
November 1943 in Jajcc, Yugoslavia was established as a federal state (this form 
was chosen to solve the national question) with a republican form of government, 
and A VNQJ was proclaimed the supreme body of the new state. Federalism was 
the only way to overcome Yugoslav national unitari:anism, whiCh had made possible 
rhe hegemony of the largest nation. Federalism included the demand for a specific 
form of dual statehood according ro which lWO categories of states were to be 
formed: one federal, a joint state based on the equality and equal rights of the 
members that had united to form iL, and six member states with their own 
statehoods, but which were also parts of the federal state. Thus the states of the 
iadividual countries (republics) were formed parallel with the establishment of 
the federal state, and they instituted their own supreme bodies of government. 
The duality of statehood immediately led to the problem of where sovereignty 
was vested. Some theoreticians considered thar only the federal state was sovereign, 
which would lead to the abolition of the federation members' sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, each federal unit had the attributes of statehood (state territory, 
political nation and organized government). There were no explicit regulations 
concerning the strict division of competence between the federal state and its 
member st:JJtes. It was considered that whatever concerns all the members belongs 
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ro lhe federal srare, and whatever is specific for each individual member belongs 
only m it. Therefore, m spiLe of factual and legal dualiLy of statehood, rhere was 
no dear division of competence between the two instances. This ambivalence was 
resolved by the srrong cohesive force of the Corrununist Parry and the Nalioual 
Liberation Army, later rhe YPA, which were the two basic integratin.g forces of 
Yugoslav unicy. Legitimacy was derived from the classical MarxisL justification for 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. coupled with its messianic role of liberating 
the entire hwnan race. This was the period of the dictatorship of the Communist 
Pany in the name of the people, and lhe people were paradigmaticaDy represented 
by the working class. In that period national relations and problems were pushed 
into lhe background, but not solved. 
Fifth period; period of the "federalization of the federation" (196!i-I980) 
The legitimacy of government based on classical Marxist ideology did noL long 
outlast the clash with the Soviet Union in 1948. A new political system began 
to be developed in an effort ro replace classical political rule with the principle 
of Lhe selfivle of the working dass. Already in 1950 the rigid form of stare 
govemmenl, led by the Communist Party, was abandoned in favour of the rule 
of direct producers, i.e. the working class. The CPY congress held from 2-7 
November 1952 in lagreb opted for the introduction of selfmanagcment. The CP 
was Lo relinquish its position of a classical party of the Communist type and justify 
its leading role in the production process itself. Because of its new role, the CP 
got a new name · the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Constitutional 
Law of 1953, which fundamentally changed Lhe legal organization of the stare, 
was sanctioned by the 1%3 Constitution. Leading theoreticians of the history of 
srate and law consider that the tendencies desired djd noL materialize and that 
instead tendencies of state rule grew stronger, in spite of verbal support for 
selfmanagcmenr. 
ln Lhe 1965-1980 period effortS were made to repulse anti-selfmanagemenr 
and hegemunistic inclinarions and affirm federal and democratic elements. This 
was an arrempt to create a new principle of homogeneity for Yugoslav society 
on lhe basis of Marxism, which would allow Lhe dlversification of cultural-political 
unity. The 1967, 1968 and 1971 amendments led to fundamental constitutional 
changes, which were completed in Lhe new 1974 Consurution. Resolution IX of 
the LCY Congress, emphasizing "that the inLcrest.s of associated labour can influence 
aD the levels of selfmanagement and political decision-making", provided the 
dominant guideline for further political development. 
An esscmial novelty of the 1974 Constitution was the introduction of the 
delegate system. This political model was styled on the Pari~ Commune and Lenin's 
Soviets and similar modes of thought. Delegations were formed between voters 
and members of state bodies, and these delegations delegated their representatives 
into higher bodies (elections were held in places of work, in the local commUnity 
and in sociopolitical organizations). Accordingly, there were three councils on the 
level of commune and republic. The political orienLation was such that many 
economic prerogatives were transferred from the federation to the republics, the 
coiiUDunes and local communities. 
Edvard Kardelj''s statement (at the Third Plenary Session of the LCY - Central 
Committee, held on 12 April 1976) describes this political solution. He said: "Our 
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democratic sy!.tem can rest: neither on the parliflmenaui.sm of tM bourgeois pohtical 
scace nor the vanimt of one party, but only and exclutsively on the selfmanagement 
democracy of associated labour in which the League of Communists and other 
factors in the organized socialist, social, scientific and cultural fields and other 
conscious furces organize and constitute themselves as rhe creative pan of the 
community of free producers". At the 30th Session of the LC Presidency (30 June 
1977) Kardelj explained a new concept of Yugoslav "democratic pluralism" that 
had the form of "selfmanagement pluralism". It was based on the delegate system 
as the "expression of plurality of selfmanagement interests". In such a system the 
organized forces of social consciousness, in the first place the League of 
Communists, would lose •political power"'. Kardelj considered that the LCY would 
not lose in importance in this way, but that its role "of leading and ideological-
political force" would increase and gain depth, because society is not made up 
only of a mass of partial interestS and aspirations, but also of the entirety of the 
conceptual, political, scientific and cultural superstructure". The l.cY's task should 
be to direct selfmanagers towards this entirety and thus avoid the fragmentation 
of society. In KardelJ's opinion this LCY role was a precondition for the successful 
development of the political system of sclfmanagement democracy. However, this 
enlightening LC role, which was geared rowards ~arding the homogeneity of a 
politica:l community, did not succeed. As the poss1bility of identity based on the 
socialist-communist ideal gradually lost its integrating force, and integration on 
the basis of work had never been developed. substirutes were sought for the lost 
ideocratic legitimacy of the parry and with them Yugoslavia moved towards its 
end. 
The integration of Yugoslav society rhus did not succeed as the idea of a single 
nationality of South Slav peoples, nor as the h~ny of one nation over others, 
nor as either of the posrwar variantS of prolecan"an inremationalism, once with 
an accent on the dictatorship of class, Le. party and then with emphasis on 
associated labour. None of this developed into a newly cohesive Yugoslav society, 
and the national principle of political homogenization moved in with full force. 
Yugoslavia is, thus, an obvious example of how difficult it is to constitute a 
multinational State. Throughout its history there was a constant struggle to achieve 
relevant political unity and this had a crucial effect on the concept of democracy. 
How did dlis influence d1e concept of democracy? 
Lt is a well-known fdd. that all political movements from the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century have declared democracy 
to be fundamental In that sense C. Sdunitt is tismt when he says that "no state 
of the West-European cultural circle could resist developing democratic ideas and 
institutions. Progress was equated with the development of democracy, and 
antidemocratic resistance was considered purely defensive" (Die geis.tesgcschichrlkhe 
Lage des heutigen Parlamenta.rismus, Berlin, 1969. pp. 30-31). Considering the 
global and historic power of democracy, no political movement could allow itself 
the luxury of refusing its servlces. 
The model of democracy most frequently used in the development of Yugoslavia 
was brilliantly elucidated by Carl Sdunin. ln political science his concept of 
democracy is known as ident:itary democracy, and it: rests on two basic principles: 
on the principle of national homogeneity and on me identity of the ruling and 
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lhc ruk'<l (sovereign and subject). Therefore, while the liberal principle emphasizes 
the pnnciple of freedom. expressed through the plurality of basic individual rights 
and special interests, this democrauc ideal emphasizes the principle or national 
unity and the identity of nanon and ruler. This dual idcnlity is expressed in the 
belief that "all power is vested in the people, which has the same meaning as 
the beHef char all power comes from God" (Ibid., p. 20). Thus dynastic legitimacy 
was transformed into democratic legitimacy. This made Sduniu conclude that 
"today the democratic principle must demand the same significance that the 
monarchistic principle bad earlier" (JbKI. , p. 39). 
This way of thinking considers that as a form of government democracy has 
no political content of its own but "can be mi.litari:.'tic or pacifist, absolutist, 
cenrrali.st:ic or decentralistic, progressive or reactionary, and anything else at 
different Limes, without ccas~ to be democracy" (Ibid., p. 39). How stretchable 
it is can be seen from the fact that it made the most varied of alliances: with 
liberalism, socialism, conservativism, Caesarism, even with Fascism and Bolshevism. 
Thus Schmitt concluded that "dictatorship is as little the opposite of democracy 
as democracy is the opposite of dictatorship" (Ibid., p. 41) . 
The main struggle in Yugoslavia constantly revolved llfound differentiating 
berween the competence of the federal state and i1s members, and this in fact 
meant a struggle about nation11l interesr:s and rights. The federal state, which was 
the prolongation of the party leadership, opposed the centrifugal force of each 
individual member of the federation. Resistance to the federal top usually converged 
around national interests. There was no n~utral mechanism to successfully resolve 
these conflictS, nor was there any archittcture of the constitutional state thar saw 
democracy as the only possible element for its make-up. We may even exaggerate 
and say that Yugoslavia was never a constirutional state, at all. If we understand 
constitution ro mean the •ennrecy of political Wlity and order" (Cat! Schmitt, 
Verfassungslehre, Berlin, 1984, p. 3), and lhc constitJIJional srare a lawmaker who 
makes laws as if they were an expression of the united will of the whole nation 
ll!ld as if every citi2en had approved them (free formulation of KBnt's stand from 
Uber den ~rudJ: DM mag in der '!1Jrode richfiK sein, OJugt aber niche 
filr dk Praxis), then Yugoslavia was never a ronstirutiooal stare. 
Democracy took the fonn of supporting decisions of the federal rop or narl.-:.nal 
leaders. Political organizations activated the masses. who then approved the moves 
of the authorities. All this ran according to the old rule: authority from the mp, 
ronfid~nce from the bottOm. 
The constant vacillation of the "entirety 6f politit.:.al unity" prevented internal 
political competition which is the only thing that can accomplish the legal and 
state architecture of a political communicy. wr.en political unity is consnmtly 
threatened it is easy m foil the fonnation of an inner constirution, and this has 
direct repercussions on the concept of democracy. 
After much fluctuation, the members of the Yugoslav state rerumed to the 
national as, it seems, the inescapable component of the constirutlon of a modem 
state. The modem stllte, according to Emst GeUner, began with the upsurge of 
nationalism. lie then adds: "the socioeconomic processes that contributed to the 
eStablishment of a more liberal consumer society produced nationalism because 
people can live comfortably only in political entities founded on maintaining a 
culrur~ that is the same as theirs'' (Merkur, Heft 8, 46. Jhrg., August 1992, p. 
653). 
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On one hand, the modem scace produced national homogenuation and thinking 
(as in France, for example), and on rhe other, narionalism often preceded the 
creation of a State and statehood. 
In any case, there is dose kinship berween the nation .and the srare. Today 
all states rry, with more or less luck, to achieve coincidence between the sratc 
and the nation. In Lhis coincidem:e they see a necessary condition for their security, 
stability and freedom. The greateSt unhappiness that can roday befall modem man 
is to remain stateless. Stateless people are today an example of righdessness, 
poverty and slavery. 
We can obviously fight for a social and democratic State based on the rule 
of law only where we already have a state based on unquestionned political unity. 
Only in the framework o( a developed constitutional srare tan we nurture 
ronstitutional patriotism that q•Jcl.ls the primitive aggression of ethnic exclusiveness. 
Only within the framework of a constitutional state can we become citizens with 
developed individual rights, which is a condition for becoming citizens of the world. 
Since Croatia is now in the phase of creating statehood, democracy is usually 
~derstood as unqucstionned support for the le.a~ing political orientation. ~his 
IS, of course, very far from true democracy. Thus tt IS not by chance- thar Sdunitt's 
model of identicary deJ11lXTclqdosely describes rhe 1X)liticaf and democratic process 
in Croatia. 
Finally, allow me to mention one more very essential clement for Wlderstanding 
modem democracy, an eJement that was not a part of socialist societies. It is 
the field called the cMl society formulated by Charles Taylor as "a nerwork of 
autonomous associatiortS independent of Lhe state thaL link citizens in matters of 
common interesr and whose exil.tcJtce or activities can influence politics" (Krzysytof 
Michalsky, Europa und Civil Society, Klett-Verlag, Sruttgan, 1991, p. 52) . 
It is, thus, a wide concept that should in the fmal issue neutralize and limit 
the totalirarian effects of politics and reduce them to a completely determined 
fiek!. In many socialist countries processes of democrat.iz:ation began with the 
rehabilitation of that concept. Although it is true that dte relative independence 
of this field contributes to the stability of modem society, it cannot solve its political 
problems. 
